海湾地区财政援助和直接投资
来源：三支一扶 发布时间：2020-09-26 点击：
E
me rging
mark ets
and
de veloping
economies fr om
Africa
t o
the
Middle
East
t o
A sia
no w
ha ve some
inte r esting
choices
in
developme nt
fi nance
part - ners .
W he r e
the
mone y
comes
fr om
mat t e rs .
F irst, sour ces
of
developme nt
fi nance
thr ough
loans
or for eign
dir ect
investme nt
create
institutional
conse - que nces
in
the
recipie nt
stat e.
Second,
the
dealmaking of
developme nt
fi nance
creates
political
alliances
that tr ansce nd
the
developme nt
tr ansaction
and,
in
many cases,
reinfor ce
patr onage
networks
and
pe rsonalist politics .
Thir d,
the
e ffi cac y
of
pr oject
delive ry
and
its long-t e rm
viability ,
whethe r
infrastructur e
investme nt in
utilities
or
social
infrastructur e
in
health
and
edu - cation,
depends
on
go ve rnance,
competition,
and
the
mutual
be ne fi ts
of
rule-based
mark ets .
M uch
e ne rgy
has
focused
on
China’s
Belt
and R oad
I nitiative
(BRI) and
the
debt -tr ap
diplomac y it
r e pr esents .
But
the r e
is
another
set
of
pla ye rs
on the
sce ne
whose
gr o wth
and
influe nce
in
this
sphe r e ha ve
bee n
largely
ignored.
Gulf
Ar ab
stat es,
partic - ularly
Saudi
Ar abia
and
the
U nit ed
Ar ab
Emir at es, ha ve
incr easingly
e mbraced
an
aggr essive
gr o wth, investme nt,
and
developme nt
model
for
the
br oade r Middle
East
and
an
expanding
sphe r e
of
influe nce north
t o
J or dan
and
Egypt,
south
t o
Y e men,
and south west
t o
the
vital
tr ade
corridor
around
the
Ar a - bian
Sea
t o ward
the
H orn
of
Africa
and
the
R ed
Sea. Lik e
the
People’s
R e public
of
China,
the
Gulf
stat es ar e
seeking
political
influe nce
thr ough
economic stat ecr aft .
This
r e port
and
an
accompanying
inte r active dataset
and
tr ack e r
ar e
an
effort
t o
unde rstand
the br eadth
and
scope
of
Gulf
aid
and
financial
inte r - ve ntion
int o
a
r e pr ese ntative
set
of
countries
in
the
Middle
East,
H orn
of
Africa,
and
W est
A sia.
The Gulf
F inancial
Aid
and
D ir ect
I nvestme nt
T r ack e r includes
all
six
Gulf
Cooper ation
Council
( GCC) stat es—Bahr ain,
K uwait,
O man,
Q atar ,
Saudi
Ar a - bia,
and
U nit ed
Ar ab
Emir at es—as
se nding
coun - tries
and
the n
tr acks
official
developme nt
assistance (as
r e port ed
b y
se nding
go ve rnme nts),
ce ntr al
bank de posits,
and
for eign
dir ect
investme nt
in
eight r eceiving
case
countries:
D jibouti,
Egypt,
Ethiopia, J or dan,
O man,
Pakistan,
Sudan,
and
Y e men.
The
clear
finding
fr om
the
Gulf
F inancial
Aid
and D ir ect
I nvestme nt
T r ack e r
is
that
the
GCC
stat es ar e
b y
far
the
largest
sour ce
of
capital
investme nt
in the
eight
recipie nt
case
countries
whe n
combined
as a
cohort .
Eve n
taking
a wa y
the
cases
in
which
othe r for eign
investme nt
would
be
less
inte r est ed
t o
inte r - ve ne
(as
in
the
case
of
Y e me n
or
Sudan
because
of
war or
sanctions),
the
GCC
stat es
appear
as
important sour ces
of
capital,
as
we
see
in
Egypt
(whe r e
for eign investme nt
is
str ong),
D jibouti,
and
O man
(whe r e China
is
unde rst ood
t o
be
a
str ong
sour ce
of
capital and
whe r e
the
cases
ar e
of
core
str at egic
inte r est
t o China’s
BRI
polic y).
A
second
objective
of
the
r e port
and
tr ack e r
is
t o de monstr ate
the
competitive
landscape
for
for eign investme nt
in
the
r eceiving
case
countries
and
indi - cate
the
gr o wing
str e ngth
of
Gulf
capital
investme nt, as
it
measur es
against
a
pe r ce ption
of
Chinese
capac - ity
in
the
wide r
Middle
East
and
e me rging
mark ets br oadly .
M ost
important,
the
compar ative
data
he r e also
de monstr ate
ho w
privat e
capital
flo ws
fr om
the U nit ed
Stat es,
U nit ed
Kingdom,
and
European
U nion compet e
against
flo ws
of
capital
fr om
stat e
capitalism sour ces
such
as
China
and
the
Gulf.
F
TRA CKING
THE
IMPLIC A TIONS
OF
S T A TE
CAPI T ALISM, AID ,
AND
INVES TMENT
FL O W S
or
much
of
the
post– World
War
II
e r a,
the
U nit ed Stat es
belie ved
its
model
of
investme nt
and
de vel - opme nt
r e pr ese nt ed
not
simply
the
sole
model
of building
aspir ational
de mocr atic
capitalism
but
one that
was
underpinned
b y
global
institutions
and
unfet - t e r ed
b y
se rious
competition.
That
is
no
longe r
true, and
while
the
U nit ed
Stat es
still
can
o ff e r
a
tr ansfor - mative
global
investme nt
and
developme nt
model,
it neithe r
does
so
aggr essively
nor
appr eciates
the
r eal - ity
of
gr o wing
competition
in
that
sphe re.
Eme rging models
of
stat e-led
gr o wth,
mark et
inte rve ntion,
and pr efe r e ntial
tr eatme nt
of
stat e
investme nt
in
mark et institutions
ar e
challe nging
the
pr efe r ence
for
de mo - cratic
capitalism
as
a
sour ce
of
ideological
in fl ue nce
and
a
pr escriptive
for
gr o wth.
These
e me rging
models
ar e
gaining
tr action
as stat es
vie
for
opportunities
as
age nts
of
finance
and developme nt
acr oss
e me rging
mark ets .
China
is
of course
a
leade r
in
this
effort
thr ough
its
Belt
and
R oad I nitiative
(BRI), but
othe r
small
stat es
with
dee p
pock - ets
ha ve
staged
equally
disruptive
inte rve ntions .
The Gulf
Ar ab
stat es
ar e
especially
active
no w
as
age nts
of developme nt
finance.
The
for eign
polic y
implications
for
the
U nit ed Stat es
in
a
post-CO VID-19
global
economy
ar e imme nse.
A s
the
demand
for
for eign
dir ect
invest - me nt,
r efinancing
of
outstanding
debt
obligations, and
ne w
debt
issuance
becomes
the
mechanism
of r eco very
for
e me rging
mark ets,
the
U nit ed
Stat es
as a
sour ce
of
privat e
financial
flo ws
will
cont e nd
with
stat e
sour ces
of
finance
with
political
ambitions . M or e
than
an
important
sour ce
of
privat e
investme nt, the
U nit ed
Stat es
stands
as
a
model
of
developme nt based
on
fr ee
mark ets,
competition,
and
rule
of
la w .
This
r e port
and
an
accompanying
inte r active dataset
and
tr ack e r
ar e
an
effort
t o
unde rstand
the br eadth
and
scope
of
Gulf
aid
and
financial
inte r - ve ntion
int o
a
r e pr ese ntative
set
of
countries
in
the Middle
East,
H orn
of
Africa,
and
W est
A sia.
The
Gulf F inancial
Aid
and
D ir ect
I nvestme nt
T r ack e r
includes all
six
Gulf
Cooper ation
Council
( GCC)
stat es—Bah - r ain,
K uwait,
O man,
Q atar ,
Saudi
Ar abia,
and
U nit ed Ar ab
Emir at es—as
se nding
countries
and
the n
tr acks official
developme nt
assistance
(as
r e port ed
b y
se nd - ing
go ve rnme nts),
ce ntr al
bank
de posits,
and
for eign dir ect
investme nt
in
eight
r eceiving
case
countries: D jibouti,
Egypt,
Ethiopia,
J or dan,
O man,
Pakistan, Sudan,
and
Y e men.
A s
a
note
on
r eceiving
country
case
selection: These
eight
recipie nt
case
countries
vary
widely
in their
geograph y ,
at tr active ness
t o
for eign
investme nt, economic
size
and
scale,
natur al
r esour ce
depe n - de nc y
and
dive rsification,
and
str at egic
importance
t o exte rnal
po we rs .
The
data
ar e
a
compilation
of
ne ws r e ports,
recipie nt
and
se nding
go ve rnme nt
data,
and for eign
dir ect
investme nt
flo ws
tr acked
b y
fD i
M ar - k ets,
a
F inancial
Times
company,
all
combined
and available
b y
r equest
and
downloadable
on
the
AEI websit e. 1
The
data
compiled
r e pr ese nt
the
period betwee n
2003 and
Ma y
2020.
I n
this
r e port,
the
six
GCC
stat es
ar e
combined
as one
analytical
unit
and
compar ed
with
capital
invest - me nt
fr om
China,
the
U nit ed
Stat es,
the
U nit ed Kingdom,
and
the
European
U nion.
The
objective
is t o
de monstr ate
the
competitive
landscape
for
for - eign
investme nt
in
the
r eceiving
case
countries
and indicat e
the
gr o wing
str e ngth
of
Gulf
capital
invest - me nt,
as
it
measur es
against
a
pe r ce ption
of
Chinese capacity
in
the
wide r
Middle
East
and
e me rging
mar - k ets
br oadly .
M ost
important,
the
compar ative
data
he r e
also de monstr ate
ho w
privat e
capital
flo ws
fr om
the U nit ed
Stat es,
U nit ed
Kingdom,
and
European
U nion work
t ogether
t o
compet e
with
flo ws
of
capital
fr om stat e
capitalism
sour ces
such
as
China
and
the
Gulf. The
findings
suggest
that
in
de monstr ating
mor e
con - siste nt
capital
flo ws
and
job
cr eation,
capital
invest - me nt
fr om
the
US,
UK ,
and
EU
pr ese nt
a
major count e rfor ce
t o
support
gr o wth,
inno vation,
entre - pr e ne urship,
individualism,
and,
one
would
hope, de mocrac y
as
the
“best
aspects
of
fr ee
mark et
capital - ism,”
as
J oshua
K urlantzick
describes . 2
Eme rging
mark ets
and
de veloping
economies
fr om Africa
t o
the
Middle
East
t o
A sia
no w
ha ve
some inte r esting
choices
in
developme nt
finance
partne rs . W he r e
the
mone y
comes
fr om
mat t e rs .
F irst,
sour ces of
developme nt
finance
thr ough
loans
or
for eign dir ect
investme nt
create
institutional
conseque nces in
the
recipie nt
stat e.
Second,
the
dealmaking
of developme nt
finance
creates
political
alliances
that tr ansce nd
the
developme nt
tr ansaction
and,
in
many cases,
reinfor ce
patr onage
networks
and
pe rsonal - ist
politics .
Thir d,
the
efficac y
of
pr oject
delive ry
and its
long-t e rm
viability ,
whethe r
infrastructur e
invest - me nt
in
utilities
or
social
infrastructur e
in
health
and education,
depends
on
go ve rnance,
competition,
and the
mutual
be nefits
of
rule-based
mark ets .
P roble matically,
much
of
the
demand
for
infr a - structur e
investme nt
in
e me rging
mark ets
is
being met
b y
pr edat ory
le nding
and
r ec ycled
petr odollars,
r athe r
than
mark et -based
solutions .
Using
the
br oad - est
definition
of
infrastructure,
the
world
spe nt
$9.5
trillion
on
all
types
of
asset
classes
in
2015,
equiv - ale nt
t o
14
pe r cent
of
global
gr oss
domestic
pr oduct, accor ding
t o
M cKinse y
research. 3
China
spends
mor e on
economic
infrastructur e
annually
than
do
the U nit ed
Stat es
and
W est e rn
Eur ope
combined.
The world
needs
t o
invest
$3.7
trillion
in
economic
infr a - structur e
annually
thr ough
2035
t o
k ee p
pace
with pr oject ed
gr o wth,
and
mor e
than
60
pe r cent
of
the investme nt
needed
will
be
in
e me rging
mark ets . 4
But,
meeting
that
finance
demand
and
tapping
int o the
developme nt
pot e ntial
of
the
Middle
East,
Easte rn Europe,
Latin
Ame rica,
China,
and
be yond
r equir es political
and
ideological
leadership.
Right
no w ,
the U nit ed
Stat es
is
outside
of
the
global
developme nt conve rsation,
forget ting
that
it
is
in
Ame rica’s
str a - t egic
inte r ests
t o
see
rule-based
mark ets
expand.
I n a
post-CO VID-19
world,
collective
economic
r eco v - e ry
will
depe nd
on
the
availability
of
finance,
espe - cially
in
e me rging
mark ets .
The
dir ection
and
amount of
financial
flo ws
ar e
important,
but
what
unde rlies the m
ar e
ideas
on
ho w
best
t o
create
gr o wth.
The r e
ar e
k e y
r egional
developme nt
act ors
in
the Middle
East
and
outside
sour ces
of
investme nt
and contr acting ,
most
notably
China.
And
while
privat e capital
flo ws,
much
of
the m
fr om
the
US,
the
UK ,
and Europe,
ar e
esse ntial
and
robust,
Gulf -based
capital
is starting
t o
dominat e.
D istinctions
betwee n
what
kind of
financial
flo ws
exist,
whe r e
the y
originat e,
and
if the y
ar e
privat e
or
go ve rnme nt
funds
ar e
oft e n
mud - died,
difficult
t o
distinguish,
or
unr e port ed
alt ogether .
F r om
a
US
for eign
polic y
pe rspective,
the
ability t o
count e r
China
r equir es
understanding
what
China actually
offe rs
t o
Ame rica’s
tr aditional
partne rs
in
the Middle
East 5
and
the n
de monstr ating
(1)
ho w
pri - vat e
capital
fr om
liber al
de mocracies
is
mor e
consis - t e nt
o ve r
time
with
str ong
r esults
in
job
cr eation
and
(2)
ho w
r egional
sour ces
of
investme nt,
specifically fr om
the
Gulf
stat es,
outweigh
China
in
many
cases as
a
sour ce
of
for eign
dir ect
investme nt
and
job
cre - ation.
The r e
is
a
pe r ce ption
gap
in
the
Middle
East, in
many
cases
pr opagated
perhaps
unint e ntionally
b y the
Gulf
stat es
the mselves,
that
outside
act ors
ar e
a major
sour ce
of
developme nt
partne rship.
The r e
is
a
particularly
sk e wed
pe r ce ption
of
China’s
r ole
in
the Middle
East,
whe n
r eally
China
enjo ys
a
bit
of
public r elations
fr ee
riding
for
pr o viding
no
massive
wa ve
in t e rms
of
dir ect
investme nt
but
mor e
in
contr acting se rvices
that
se rve
mostly
t o
pa y
go ve rnme nt -linked firms
in
China,
sustain
le nding
thr ough
Chinese banks,
and
oft e n
e mplo y
Chinese
citize ns
or
poorly paid
migr ant
work e rs
in
the
Gulf.
The
ideal
developme nt
partner
becomes
defined b y
an
ability
t o
change
the
ph ysical
e nvir onme nt
and the
har d
infrastructur e
of
buildings,
r athe r
than
facil - itating
the
fr ee
mo ve me nt
and
accessibility
of
finan - cial
capital
and
supporting
the
gr o wth
of
human
or int ellectual
capital
in
learning
e nvir onme nts,
entre - pr e ne urship
expe rie nce,
and
e ve n
failur e.
I n
this se nse,
the
ideology
of
stat e
capitalism
has
become
a pr efe rr ed
r egional
developme nt
appr oach
based
on the
pe r ce ption
of
success,
r athe r
than
e vide nce
of pot e ntial
for
economic
gr o wth
acr oss
society .
M uch
e ne rgy
has
focused
on
China’s
BRI
and the
debt -tr ap
diplomac y
it
r e pr esents .
But
the r e
is another
set
of
pla ye rs
on
the
sce ne
whose
gr o wth
and influe nce
in
this
sphe r e
ha ve
bee n
largely
ignored. Gulf
Ar ab
stat es,
particularly
Saudi
Ar abia
and
the U nit ed
Ar ab
Emir at es,
ha ve
incr easingly
e mbraced an
aggr essive
gr o wth,
investme nt,
and
developme nt model
for
the
br oade r
Middle
East
and
an
expanding sphe r e
of
influe nce
north
t o
J or dan
and
Egypt,
south t o
Y e men,
and
south west
t o
the
vital
tr ade
corridor around
the
Ar abian
Sea
t o ward
the
H orn
of
Africa and
the
R ed
Sea.
Lik e
the
People’s
R e public
of
China, the
Gulf
stat es
ar e
seeking
political
influe nce
thr ough economic
stat ecr aft .
I n
studying
the
political
economy
of
developme nt, politics
oft e n
become
secondary
t o
economic
theory pr escriptions
for
gr o wth.
Each
country
faces
specific challe nges
and
exists
within
concentric
domestic, r egional,
and
inte rnational
sphe r es
of
influe nce. D espit e
mor e
than
a
ce ntury
of
acade mic
inquiry
int o
wealth
and
disparity
betwee n
political
syst e ms, a
gr eat
deal
of
debat e
r e mains
about
the
best
wa ys
t o e nd
po ve rty.
N otwithstanding
the
acrimony
in
aca - de mic
and
polic y
circles,
ho weve r ,
the
ge ne r al
tr e nd of
po ve rty
reduction
and
access
t o
finance
achie ved thr ough
the
Br et t on
W oods
syst e m
has
de monstr at ed incr edible
progr ess .
The
logic
of
developme nt
assistance
aft e r
World War
II
has
bee n
based
on
a
conse nsus
that
ope n
mar - k ets
ar e
best
able
t o
delive r
gr o wth
and
that
le ve r age fr om
inte rnational
financial
institutions
t o
e ncour - age
liber alization
and
rule
of
la w
can
nudge
(or for ce) go ve rnme nts
t o
mak e
bet t e r
economic
choices .
That advice
has
bee n
largely
successful,
as
the
World
Bank r e ports,
at
cr eating
r e markable
and
unpr ecede nt ed progr ess
in
r educing
extre me
po ve rty
o ve r
the
past quart e r
ce ntury.
I n
2015,
mor e
than
a
billion
fe we r people
we r e
living
in
extre me
po ve rty
than
in
1990. The
progr ess
has
bee n
drive n
b y
str ong
global
gr o wth and
the
rising
wealth
of
many
de veloping
countries, particularly
in
the
world’s
most
populous
r egions
of East
A sia
and
P aci fi c
and
South
A sia. 6
The
ope ning
of
China
and
the
ignition
of
econ - omies
in
South
A sia,
drive n
b y
a
global
conse nsus on
the
po we r
of
liber alization
and
access
t o
finance, has
changed
the
world.
H o weve r ,
it
did
not
hap - pe n
in
a
vacuum.
Ame rican
ideas
about
mark ets inspired
China’s
liber alization
and
the n
facilitat ed
it thr ough
access
t o
capital
fr om
inte rnational
finan - cial
institutions
that
Ame rica
helped
creat e.
I n
fact, China’s
access
t o
World
Bank
loans
and,
mor e br oadly ,
the
advice
and
access
t o
institutions
of a
global
liber al
economic
or de r
ha ve
e nabled
and accele r at ed
its
gr o wth. 7
Y et,
the
quest
for
economic
gr o wth
is
“elusive,”
as William
Easte rly
describes
it, 8
because
cultur e,
his - t ory ,
natur al
r esour ces,
and
geograph y
vary
gr eatly
in wealth y
and
poor
countries .
Economic
developme nt is
not
just
depende nt
on
capital
flo ws
or
capital
accu - mulation,
nor
is
aid
a
panacea
and
a
one-st op
solution t o
po ve rty. 9
M or eo ve r ,
debt
relief
as
a
form
of
for eign
aid
does lit tle
if
political
beha vior
(and
a
reliance
on
borr o wing or
printing
curr ency)
continues
in
the
same
pat t e rns as
befor e.
Eve n
e nlight e ned
leadership
cannot
create
economic
gr o wth
on
its
o wn.
A s
work
b y
J ose ph
Sti - glitz
and
othe rs
has
ackno wledged,
human
capital is
also
esse ntial
t o
economic
gr o wth,
as
is
a
cultur e of
learning
and
kno wledge
pr oduction,
which
oft e n includes
risk-taking
and
entre pr e ne urship. 10
A s
a
par - ticular
challe nge
t o
China,
H ongbin
Li
et
al.
and
othe r scholars
ar e
no w
mor e
willing
t o
e ngage
the
causal po we r
of
softe r
institutions,
fr om
education
polic y
t o media,
t o
cr edit
the
r ole
of
ideas
in
e ncour aging
and sustaining
economic
gr o wth. 11
O the r
questions
on
the
appr opriat e
r ole
of
the stat e
in
economic
developme nt
continue
t o
ge ne r ate debat e
betwee n
public
choice
theorists
(such
as
J ames Buchanan
and
R obe rt
T ollison 12 )
and
developme nt economists
(such
as
J ose ph
Stiglitz
and
K arla
H off 13 ) who
see
a
mor e
active
r ole
for
the
stat e.
H o weve r , the r e
is
some
conse nsus
that
institutions
mat t e r ,
as the
pionee ring
work
of
D ouglas
N orth
de monstr at ed, as
do
ideas
and
informal
institutions
or
pat t e rns
of beha vior
and
beliefs
that
establish
“wa ys
of
doing business .” 14
I n
this
se nse,
the
normative
po we r
of rule-based
economic
institutions
and
the
politics
that support
the m
can
ha ve
e normous
effects
on
de velop - me nt
outcomes,
whethe r
the
goals
ar e
alle viating
po v - e rty
or
impr o ving
basic
access
t o
social
infrastructur e such
as
health
and
education.
P olitical
scientists
ha ve
also
struggled
t o
det e r - mine
de mocrac y’s
effect
on
economic
gr o wth
and if
the r e
is
a
causal
r elationship
betwee n
economic developme nt
and
the
initiation
and
consolidation
of de mocrac y .
Se ymour
M artin
Lipset’s
work, 15
along with
Barringt on
M oor e’s
classic
mode rnization
for - mulation
of
“no
bourgeoisie,
no
de mocrac y ,” 16
pr ed - icat ed
the
gr o wth
of
wealth
and
a
middle
class
t o support
de mocr atic
developme nt .
H o weve r ,
lat e r work
b y
Guille rmo
O’D onnell
and
othe rs
ques - tioned
ho w
some
forms
of
economic
developme nt and
industrialization,
particularly
managed
b y
the stat e,
could
create
alt e rnative
political
institutions that
leaned
(or twist ed)
t o ward
authoritarianism. 17 Stat e-led
gr o wth
and
the
East
A sian
mir acle 18
in
the 1990s,
the n
China’s
economic
liber alization
and
rise in
the
2000s,
ha ve
ce rtainly
diminished
the
explan - at ory
po we r
of
economic
gr o wth
as
an
indication
of futur e
de mocr atization.
W hich
brings
us
back
t o
trying
t o
unde rstand
ho w economic
gr o wth,
po we r ed
b y
inte rnal
or
exte rnal for ces,
has
se ve r al
institutional
and
political
path - wa ys .
O utside
for ces—whether
bilat e r al
aid,
multi - lat e r al
le nde rs,
or
mor e
dir ect
financial
inte rve ntion as
an
act
of
economic
stat ecr aft
b y
an
ally
or
adve r - sary—can
r edir ect
a
path
t o ward
pr ospe rity
or
t o ward po ve rty,
go ve rnme nt
mismanage me nt,
and
extre me concentr ation
of
wealth.
And
in
the
meantime,
inte r - ve ntions
of
eithe r
kind
ma y
t ear
do wn
political
gr ee n shoots
of
accountability
and
competition.
The
t e n - de nc y
for
r e nt -seeking 19
beha vior
t o
extract
uncom - pe nsat ed
value
fr om
othe rs
without
contributing
t o pr oductivity
can
be
r ampant
whe n
exte rnal
sour ces
of aid
and
investme nt
ha ve
fe w
strings
at tached.
Scholarship
b y
J ohn
Ge rring
et
al.
has
questioned the
dur ability
of
de mocrac y
as
an
indicat or
of
contin - ued
economic
pe rformance,
not
for
the
survival
time but
mor e
for
de mocr acies’
ability
t o
create
pat t e rns of
beha vior
in
polic y
conse nsus
and
enact
successful polic y
reform. 20
This
suggests,
again,
that
the
qual - ity
of
institutions
and
the
pr actice
of
competition of
ideas
and
conse nsus
building
in
de mocracies
best support
sustained
economic
pe rformance.
Br eakthr ough
work
b y
D ar on
Ace moglu
and J ames
R obinson 21
aptly
explains
wh y
and
ho w
eco - nomic
gr o wth
occurs
and
what
political
institutions best
support
it .
Their
conclusions
ar e
esse ntial
t o understanding
the
risk
of
“hot
mone y”
or
pe rsonal - ist
tr ansfe rs
of
developme nt
aid
and
dir ect
invest - me nt
support
in
fr agile
political
economies
in
Africa and
the
br oade r
Middle
East .
Their
theory
r ests on
the
natur e
of
institutions—meaning
the
rules, both
formal
and
informal,
that
go ve rn
economic and
political
life.
Ce rtain
types
of
economic
infr a - structur e
such
as
pr ope rty
rights
or
e nfor ce me nt of
contracts
create
ince ntives
for
investme nt
and inno vation.
Those
institutions
that
can
create
a
le vel pla ying
field
whe r e
both
local
citize ns
and
for eign invest ors
can
use
their
skills
and
tale nts
ar e
“inclu - sive
economic
institutions .”
O n
the
othe r
hand, “exclusive
economic
institutions”
ar e
designed
t o extract
r esour ces
fr om
society
for
the
be nefit
of
a fe w .
These
economic
institutions
ar e
sustained
b y political
institutions
concentrat ed
in
o wne rship.
Ace moglu
and
R obinson’s
takea wa y
is
clear:
Y ou cannot
succeed
economically
if
you
do
not
get
your politics
right,
but
the r e
is
no
formula
for
get ting
pol - itics
right.
N e ve rtheless,
we
can
identify
methods of
stat ecr aft
and
inte rve ntion
that
mak e
economic gr o wth
less
politically
stable
and
less
lik ely
t o
e nge n - de r
participat ory
politics .
It
is
also
possible
t o
e mpir - ically
tr ack
and
e valuat e
ho w
developme nt
aid
and financial
inte rve ntion
fr om
ne w
authoritarian
sour ces influe nce
the
domestic
politics
of
recipie nt
stat es .
W e can
identify
points
of
vulne r ability
and
tr ack
r ecor ds of
pe rformance.
Understanding
the
ince ntives
of
economic
stat e - cr aft 22
for
those
stat es
willing
t o
exte nd
aid,
for eign dir ect
investme nt,
loans
and
cr edit,
and
dir ect
cash support
t o
ce ntr al
banks
or
in-kind
pr oducts
of
oil
and gas
complicat es
a
one-sided
vie w
of
the
developme nt age nda.
It
is
not
just
the
recipie nt
stat e’s
fault
if
its economic
polic y
choices
fail
t o
delive r;
it
is
also
a
col - labor ation
of
unequal
and
sometimes
dive rge nt
stat e inte r ests .
I n
the
case
of
inte rve ntion
during
a
political tr ansition
fr om
authoritarianism
or
a
tr ansition
fol - lo wing
civil
war
or
conflict,
the
risks
of
developme nt aid
and
investme nt
become
incr easingly
fr aught,
with the
lik elihood
of
conflict
recurr ence
fueled
b y
an influx
of
r esour ces
that
can
be
hoar ded
and
local-le vel grievances
that
seek
r etribution
aft e r
conflict,
as
the work
of
P aul
Collier
has
de monstr at ed. 23
The
lite r atur e
on
the
political
economy
of
de velop - me nt
and
de mocrac y
has
contribut ed
t o
our
unde r - standing
of
wh y
economic
pe rformance
varies
acr oss r egimes
and
geogr aphies.
R esear chers
ha ve
also established
se ve r al
variables
seeking
t o
measur e
the str e ngth
of
the
r elationship
betwee n
de mocrac y
and economic
gr o wth.
All
this
work,
ho weve r ,
assumes
ce rtain
po we r dynamics
of
the
inte rnational
syst e m
and
its
institu - tional
capacity
t o
e ngage
as
age nts
of
developme nt finance
and
sour ces
of
economic
advice.
The
syst e m is
what
has
changed.
The
Br et t on
W oods,
post colonial
world
of
developme nt
has
shift ed—particularly
in
the assumption
of
Ame rican
leadership
and
hegemony
in a
liber al
economic
or de r .
I n
fact,
a
r ece nt
essa y
in
the
F inancial
Times
argues that
of
the
three
main
alt e rnatives
of
the
20th
ce n - t u r y — l iber alism,
fascism,
and
Communism—only liber alism
r e mains. 24
Y et,
ne w
populist
mo ve me nts and
authoritarian
r esurge nce
challe nge
k e y
ele me nts of
liber alism.
D efining
liber alism
has
also
become
about
selec - tive
ele me nts,
r athe r
than
an
understanding
of
ho w its
economic
and
political
t enets
work
t ogether .
Eco - nomic
liber alism
upholds
fr ee
mark ets,
the
value of
contracts,
and
e nfor ce me nt
mechanisms,
and it
insists
on
the
efficac y
and
mutual
be nefit
of
fr ee tr ade.
P olitical
liber alism
upholds
fr ee
elections
and fr eedom
of
expr ession
and
appr eciates
the
value
of institutions
in
facilitating
coope r ation
betwee n
coun - tries .
A s
Y uval
N oah
Har ari
argues,
many
de veloping countries
no w
pr efe r
the
“buffet”
appr oach
t o
liber al - ism:
picking
and
choosing
among
its
ele me nts,
r athe r than
combining
its
political
and
economic
t enets . 25
D ebat es
on
rising
inequality
and
the
threat
of
t e r - rorism
both
support
alt e rnative
visions
of
political and
economic
go ve rnance.
Those
visions
ar e
less conce rned
with
inte rnational
norms,
multilat e r al e ngage me nt,
rule-based
mark ets,
and
individual
fr ee - doms.
The y
justify
inte rve ntion
and
r e pr ession
on the
gr ounds
of
stability ,
while
their
deplo yme nt
of wealth,
earned
thr ough
natur al
r esour ces
and
stat e- contr olled
industry,
allo ws
the m
t o
advance
a
mon - e yed
soft
po we r
with
tangible
commitme nts
of
cash, infrastructure,
and
investme nt .
W hile
many
analysts
ar e
no w
focused
on
the
size and
scale
of
Chinese
investme nt,
and
some
ar e
a wak - e ning
t o
the
r ole
of
othe r
financial
inte rve ntionists in
e me rging
mark ets,
the r e
is
not
a
compr ehe nsive study
of
ho w
these
ne w
act ors
fit
int o
a
sea
change in
sour ces
of
developme nt
finance,
including
the
ris - ing
importance
of
South-South
financial
flo ws
and r egional
cent e rs
of
investme nt .
The r e
is
an
uphea val in
our
understanding
of
the
political
economy
of developme nt
and
the
logical
impacts
we
can
expect
t o find
in
go ve rnance
and
support
for
de mocrac y .
This resear ch
r e port
and
dataset
seek
t o
analyze
and
tr ack
the
importance
of
the
Gulf
Ar ab
stat es
as
invest ors and
age nts
of
developme nt
ideas.
China
and
the
Gulf
Ar ab
stat es
ar e
actively e ngaged
as
age nts
of
developme nt
finance
for
their o wn
financial
and
political
inte r ests
and
with
lit tle e ngage me nt
with
multilat e r al
financial
institutions, official
developme nt
age ncies,
or
privat e
finance. Work
b y
AEI
scholar
D e r ek
Scissors
and
the
China Global
I nvestme nt
T r ack e r
ha ve
bee n
esse ntial
in tr acking
and
establishing
the
scope
of
Chinese
finan - cial
investme nt
in
e me rging
mark ets . 26
Bak e r
M ack - e nzie
estimat es
that
Chinese
pr ojects
associat ed with
the
BRI
will
ha ve
a
value
of
$350
billion
b y
2022, while
mor e
than
1,7 00
BRI
pr ojects
ar e
alr eady
com - plet ed
or
in
developme nt . 27
The
phe nomenon
of
Gulf
Ar ab
stat e
support
in the
H orn
of
Africa,
the
Middle
East,
and
Pakistan
is only
gr o wing
in
inte nsity .
M y
o wn
work
has
bee n
at the
forefr ont
of
efforts
t o
unde rstand
this
r egional deplo yme nt
of
economic
stat ecr aft . 28
M or eo ve r , s i n c e
2 0 11 ,
economic
stat ecr aft,
whethe r
thr ough dir ect
commitme nts
of
fi nancial
support,
pr omises of
for eign
dir ect
investme nt,
or
in-kind
oil
and
gas tr ansfers,
has
bee n
ple ntiful
and
fr om
sour ces
on both
sides
of
the
GCC
political
divide.
A s
of
yet,
no scholarship
has
connect ed
this
tr e nd
t o
China’s
activ - ities
and
the
br oade r
de fi cit
of
liber al
economic
polic y appr oaches
t o ward
e me rging
mark et
go ve rnance
and fi nance
needs .
This
is
a
disruption 29
of
ho w
models
of
economic developme nt
ha ve
work ed
thr ough
inte rnational institutions
with
Ame rican
leadership
and
a
ne w
com - petition
fr om
stat e
capitalism
models
that
ar e
flexible in
their
use
of
types
of
financial
flo ws .
The
ne w
“mas - t e rs
of
developme nt
finance” 30
ar e
China
and
the
Gulf Ar ab
stat es .
I n
the
Middle
East,
the
H orn
of
Africa, and
South
A sia,
these
two
for ces
ar e
oft e n
working in
syne rgy .
This
trifecta
of
aid,
investme nt,
and
dir ect
finan - cial
inte rve ntion
is
a
form
of
economic
stat ecr aft . 31 I ts
rationale
is
the
security
and
pr ospe rity
of
the donor
or
invest or .
Because
the
Gulf
Ar ab
stat es
ha ve r ecognized
a
vital
nexus
betwee n
developme nt
and security
in
their
surr ounding
geograph y ,
the
logic of
supporting
frie ndly
neighboring
go ve rnme nts
t o
secur e
politic...
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