影子银行外文翻译-影子银行业务诱惑

　外文资料翻译译文 影子银行业务的诱惑 影子银行曾是引发金融危机的一个帮手。监管得好的话，他们可有助于避免下一次金融危机。

　 日前，英格兰银行行长兼金融稳定委员会（一个为防范未来金融危机而设立的国际监管机构，简称 FSB）主席马克·卡尼曾被要求指出世界经济的最大威胁。他的选择是存在于新兴市场中的影子银行业务。影子银行业务具备成为一个全球性怪物的资格，这是毫无疑问的。它们不仅个头庞大，躯体某一部分的发育特别迅速，而且还很少能被认识清楚——管理得当，它们就是一种强大的工具；管理不当，它们就是潜在的炸弹。

　 FSB 将影子银行业务定义为非银行类机构的贷款行为。据它测算，影子银行的业务量占全球金融体系的四分之一，它们持有的资产的价值，已经从十年前的26 万亿美元，上涨至去年年初的 71 万亿美元。在一些国家中，影子银行的扩张速度甚至比这个还要快、例如，在中国，它们仅在 2012 年一年，就实现了业务量 42%的增长。

　 但是，在如何定义影子银行业务方面，是存在着分歧的，争论的焦点是信贷（指的是从提供贷款的中国信托公司到西方的 P2P 贷款项目和货币市场基金所从事的一切金融行为）。然而，如果把范围再扩大一点，凡是类似于银行业务但却是由不像银行那样接受监管的企业所作出的行为，都可以算作是影子银行业务。例如，由沃达丰提供的移动支付系统，由技术企业设立的债券交易平台，或是贝莱德出售的投资产品。

　 正如我们专题报道所解释的那样，类似于这样的服务正在迅速繁殖。究其原因，盖因在金融危机期间因损失惨重而遭受打击的传统银行正处于守势之中，迫于监管包袱的愈发沉重，资本金要求的日益提高，法律诉讼的无休无止和罚款金额的不断增加，传统银行都在收缩开支，减少贷款，甚至是整个部门整个部门地关闭一些业务。例如，在美国，投资银行已经不能再利用自营账户进行交易，只能是代表客户进行交易。与此同时，英国的银行一直都在消减针对商业部门的贷款，这部分贷款量自 2007 年以来已经减少了 30%，而巴克莱银行也已于本周证实了消减 14000 名雇员的计划。影子银行正在填补这部分空白。

　 银行，你的名字叫“虚弱” 没有人会对发生在银行副业领域中的这种竞争太过担心。比如说，如果谷歌能够帮助人们更高效地理财，谷歌的这种行为就是受欢迎的。争论主要是围绕着“信贷”展开。从某种角度来看，银行体系之外的贷款行为正在增多，这是一件好事。银行之所以要接受监管，是因为以下这个原因：他们有大量的“期限错配”（就是说，它们借钱的时候，多以短期合约为主；而在贷款时，又多以长期合约为主）和巨大的杠杆，并且还同其他金融机构之间形成了错综复杂的关系，因此

　他们是非常脆弱的。同时，当他们遇到麻烦时，由于政府既要保护储户，又害怕让如此庞大和如此复杂的机构倒闭，纳税人就往往会成为受害者。因此，如果某些贷款业务正在由银行转向不那么危险的实体，金融体系应当会更安全。

　鉴于以上这些原因，如果某家英国啤酒厂商，从有着长期应付义务的养老金基金或者寿险公司，而不是从银行那里接受了一笔长期贷款，卡尼应该对此感到更高兴。这是因为，如果这笔贷款出了问题，赔钱的将是债权人。但是，由于这些债权人没有使用杠杆，他们之间也不存在错综复杂的关系网，也没有储户向他们要钱。因此，一家机构的损失是不大有可能给其他机构造成冲击的。

　 然而，如果监管不力的话，影子银行就可能如能身于明处的银行一样危险。作为金融危机的一大罪魁祸首，“结构性投资工具”是一种由银行创造出来用以出售被再次打包成债券的贷款的合法实体。从理论上讲，它们是独立的。但是，一旦遇上麻烦，它们会把创设它们的银行也拉下水。另一个不稳定的根源是，企业和个人借以将自己的闲置资金进行短期投资工具而使用的货币市场基金。它们曾一度被认为是没有风险的。当他们不是没有风险这一事实变得日趋明显时，它们会遭遇银行挤兑式的赎回。

　 中国的影子资金

　 灾难教给了监管者有用的经验教训。引发最大问题的影子银行要么是持有大量的期限错配，要么是没有足够的资本金来吸收损失，而其中最令人不安的，则是那些把自己的困难传染给了银行的影子银行，因为银行或是曾把资金借给过它们，或是曾为它们提供过某种担保。当事实证明这些本着从较不严格的监管机构那里占便宜的目的而创建的影子银行同传统银行一样的脆弱和危险时，这丝毫不会令人感到奇怪。

　 许多国家监管新政的目的就为了让此类弄虚作假的行为成为不可能。例如，银行现在必须要将其结构化投资工具合并至资产负债表中。货币市场基金必须持有更多的流动资产以防遭遇银行挤兑式赎回。针对杠杆的限制已经开始实施，针对各种各样的影子银行的限制也正在考虑之中。

　 然而，正如卡尼所担心的那样，让影子银行变得安全的工作还远没有完成。例如，美国的监管者仍在听任某些货币市场基金制造“投资者永远不会在货币基金中赔钱”的印象。货币市场基金应当被强制变得更诚实。

　 但是，更大的风险是在监管套利行为正以惊人的规模而发生的中国。在那里，银行是被禁止向某些特定行业发放贷款的，而且还被禁止以高额回报来诱惑储户。因此，该国的银行在做这两件事时，都是以间接的方式、通过各种各样的影子银行来进行的。不仅如此，该国还有一些企业把自己定位于虚拟银行的角色：一家造船厂需要用钱，它能够利用集资获得三分之一的资金。所有那些被发放给不盈利的钢铁厂和过度扩张的房地产开发商的影子贷款将来能够被偿还是难以想象的。尽管如此，受一系列到目前为止能让他们不会由于贷款已经变质而受到伤害的救助行为的鼓励，投资者仍在而将大量资金投入此类贷款。

　 这是一场正在酝酿中的危机。它不会拖垮中国。这不仅是因为中国政府能够

　利用国有银行来降低其影响，而且还因为中国政府手中有足够的现金可供他们挥霍，以扭转局面。但是，影子银行仍然会让他们付出代价。中国政府早一天讲明白哪些资产是受保护的，投资者就能早一天把精力更多地用于防范风险上面。影子银行能让金融变得更安全，但是这只有在搞清楚谁的钱正处于危险之中的情况下才有可能。

　 外文原文 The lure of shadow banking

　Shadow banks helped cause the financial crisis. Better regulated, they could help avert the next one

　 MARK CARNEY, governor of the Bank of England and head of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international watchdog set up to guard against future financial crises, was recently asked to identify the greatest danger to the world economy. He chose shadow banking in the emerging markets. Shadow banking certainly has the credentials to be a global bogeyman. It is huge, fast-growing in certain forms and little understood—a powerful tool for good but, if carelessly managed, potentially explosive.

　 The FSB, which defines shadow banking as lending by institutions other than banks, reckons it accounts for a quarter of the global financial system, with assets of $71 trillion at the beginning of last year, up from $26 trillion a decade earlier. In some countries, shadow banks are expanding even faster: in China, for instance, they grew by 42% in 2012 alone. But there is disagreement about what counts as shadow banking. The core is credit (everything from China"s loan-making trust companies to Western peer-to-peer lending schemes and money-market funds). A broader definition, however, would include any bank-like activity undertaken by a firm not regulated as a bank: think of the mobile-payment systems offered by Vodafone, the bond-trading platforms set up by technology firms or the investment products sold by BlackRock. As our special report explains, services like these are proliferating because orthodox banks are on the back foot, battered by losses incurred during the financial crisis and beset by heavier regulation, higher capital requirements, endless legal troubles and swingeing fines. The banks are retrenching, cutting lending and shutting whole divisions. In America, for instance, investment banks are no longer allowed to trade on their own account, only on behalf of clients. British banks, meanwhile, have slashed their loans to businesses by almost 30% since 2007, with Barclays this week confirming plans to shed up to 14,000 staff. Shadow banks are filling these gaps.

　 Frailty, thy name is bank

　 Nobody is too worried by competition to banks in their ancillary businesses: if, say, Google can help people manage their money more efficiently, that is to be welcomed. The argument is about credit. In some ways, it is a good thing that lending outside the banking system is expanding. Banks are regulated for a reason: they have big “maturity mismatches” (borrowing money largely for short periods while lending

　it out for the longer term), enormous leverage and are tangled up in complicated ways with other financial institutions, so they are especially fragile. And when they get into trouble, taxpayers tend to end up on the hook, because governments both guarantee deposits and are frightened to let such big and complicated institutions fail. So if some lending is moving from banks to less dangerous entities, the financial system should be safer. For these reasons, Mr Carney should be happier if, say, a British brewer takes a long-term loan from a pension fund or a life insurer with long-term liabilities instead of from a bank. If the loan goes wrong, the creditor will lose money, but without the gelignite of leverage, the elaborate web of counterparties and the depositors demanding their money now, losses in one institution are less likely to damage others.

　 Yet shadow banks, if poorly regulated, can be just as dangerous as the better-lit sort. One of the principal culprits in the financial crisis was the “structured investment vehicle”, a legal entity created by banks to sell loans repackaged as bonds. These were notionally independent, but when they got into trouble they pulled in the banks that had set them up. Another source of instability were money-market funds, through which firms and individuals invested spare cash for short spells. These had been thought of as risk-free. When it became apparent that they were not, they suffered a run.

　 China"s dark money

　 The disaster taught regulators useful lessons. The shadow banks that caused the biggest problems had either big maturity mismatches or not enough capital to absorb losses. Most troublesome of all were those whose difficulties infected the banks, because the banks had either lent them money or had provided them with a backstop of some kind. Not surprisingly, the shadow banks that were created solely to take advantage of a less exacting regulatory regime turned out to be just as fragile and dangerous as banks.

　 New regulations in many countries aim to make such shams impossible. Banks must now incorporate structured investment vehicles on their balance-sheets, for instance. Money-market funds must hold more liquid assets, to guard against runs. Limits on leverage have been imposed or are being considered for many forms of shadow bank.

　 Yet as Mr Carney"s anxieties suggest, the job of making shadow banks safe is far from complete. For instance, American regulators are still allowing some money-market funds to create the impression that an investor can never lose money in them. They should be forced to be more honest.

　 But the bigger danger lies in China, where regulatory arbitrage is happening on an alarming scale. Banks there are banned from expanding lending to certain

　industries, and from luring deposits by offering high returns. So they do both of these things indirectly, through shadow banks of various sorts. Meanwhile, some firms are setting themselves up as pseudo-banks: one shipyard makes a third of its money from finance (see article). It is hard to imagine that all the shadowy loans to unprofitable steel mills and overextended property developers will pay off. Yet investors are being encouraged to pile in by a series of bail-outs that have so far shielded them from most of the harm when such loans have soured. This is a crisis in the making. It will not bring China down—the government can use state-owned banks to temper its effects, and it has enough cash to spend lavishly to set things right. But it could still cost a lot. The sooner the regime spells out which assets are protected, the sooner investors will take more care about risk. Shadow banking can make finance safer, but only if it is clear whose money is on the line.